SESSION 3: NORTHEAST ASIA NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

A Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
With a Three Plus Three Arrangement

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§ Introduction
After the end of the Cold War, a Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ) became more than a political slogan and several concrete proposals with different arrangements have been proposed since. Among others, the present author proposed a scenario called “three plus three” in 1996, in which a trilateral NEA-NWFZ treaty among Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was envisioned. As well, it included a special protocol for negative security assurances by the three neighboring nuclear weapon states -- China, Russia and the United States of America. Later, in 2004, a model treaty was developed by the same author in cooperation with NGOs in Japan and the ROK. In that model treaty, while it continuing to be based upon the three plus three scenario, a six-party treaty, rather than a three-party treaty, was proposed. The parties to the treaty would be placed in two categories: “Intrazonal states” (Japan, ROK and DPRK) and “neighboring nuclear weapon states” (China, Russia and the U.S.). Geographically, the NEA-NWFZ is composed of the territory of the intrazonal states. Security assurances by neighboring nuclear weapon states were incorporated into the main text of the treaty because they are deemed essential to the treaty negotiation process from its outset.

§ Evolvement of Security Environment
These initial studies were driven by mid or long term goals in mind.
-- To prevent a foreseeable competitive escalation of nuclear development among Japan, the ROK and the DPRK, or between Japan and a reunified Korea.
-- To establish mechanisms to implement the provisions of the NEA-NWFZ including verification and energy cooperation, as the first step toward further confidence building and broader cooperative security mechanisms in the region.
-- To demonstrate the possibility of a security framework free from extended nuclear deterrence in a region closely surrounded by nuclear weapon states. Thus, it will contribute to global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

While these objectives still remain relevant today, substantial political changes have occurred in the past ten years, requiring a renewed assessment of the steps to be taken to forward the agenda of a NEA-NWFZ.
One positive development is the birth of the Six-Party Talks in August 2003. At the time of the introduction of a NEA-NWFZ with the three plus three arrangement in 1996, there were no Six-Party Talks. The Talks eventually involved the same six countries as proposed for the NWFZ and became a potential forum to discuss such a zone. When we developed a six-party model treaty, there was no September 2005 joint statement, the fundamental agreement among the six countries. The 2005 joint statement acknowledges the relevance of security cooperation in Northeast Asia to “the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” by saying: “The Six Parties agreed to explore ways and means for promoting security cooperation in Northeast Asia.” A NEA-NWFZ is typical of such ways and means for security cooperation. Moreover, the agreement of February 2007 on “Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement” established five working groups including one specific to a “Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism.”

Another innovative element was included in the 2005 joint statement. In addition to the DPRK’s commitment to “abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs,” the United States affirmed that it has “no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons.” This means that future security assurances by nuclear weapon states could be extended to include response to an attack by conventional weapons and that an unprecedented regional security cooperation mechanism could possibly be envisioned in this regard.

On the other hand, the past five years have seen serious negative development regarding the DPRK nuclear program. The DPRK conducted two underground nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009. Although the weaponization of those devices has not yet been proven, it will not be surprising if this happens in the near future. Also, the DPRK demonstrated its ongoing indigenous plan of so-called “Juche-based nuclear power industry,” involving the construction of at least one small light water reactor (LWR) and a modern centrifuge uranium enrichment facility as was witnessed by a team of U.S. experts that visited Pyongyang in November 2010.

The latter development relating to the LWR is considered to be more or less consistent with the DPRK’s arguments maintained before and after the start of the Six-Party Talks and could be used as a renewed path for the international community to engage the DPRK with multi-facet deliberations. Regarding the former development of escalated nuclear deterrence, it is important to note that the DPRK has never hinted that it would possess a nuclear deterrent for the purpose of dominance, but it continues to say to the effect that the deterrence is needed to assure national security and regime preservation. In this context, this year’s Joint New Year Editorial in leading DPRK newspapers reads, “The DPRK is consistent in its stand and will to achieve peace in Northeast Asia and denuclearization of
the whole of the Korean peninsula.\textsuperscript{6}"

Under these circumstances, the international community has urged the DPRK to fulfill the commitments of the Six-Party Talks in accordance with the September 2005 joint statement at the 2010 NPT Review Conference\textsuperscript{7}. Furthermore, the Conference Final Document reads that, “(t)he Conference also calls on the DPRK and all States parties to fully implement all relevant nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament obligations” and “reaffirmed its firm support for the Six-Party Talks and remains determined to achieve the satisfactory and comprehensive resolution to the issues involved through diplomatic means.” These statements imply the recognition that the DPRK’s nuclear issue is part of broader global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament issues.

§ Difficulties, not Unusual but Diverse in Establishing NWFZs

Some think that as long as the DPRK is not ready to discard its nuclear weapons program, a NEA-NWFZ will remain a remote aspiration or even a mere unrealistic dream. However, the difficulty involved in establishing a NEA-NWFZ is nothing exceptional when we look at the histories of efforts to establish the existing NWFZs. Those histories tell us that forerunners’ efforts for NWFZs began with legitimate people’s aspiration and political will that went well beyond the inevitable challenges of such endeavors.

In the case of the African NWFZ, African nations successfully gained a United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution for a NWFZ on the African Continent in 1961, in response to French nuclear testing in the Sahara Desert in Algeria, a French colony at that time. In spite of the adoption of the UNGS resolution, French nuclear tests continued there for four years even after the independence of Algeria in 1962. Meanwhile a suspected nuclear weapon program in the Republic of South Africa emerged in 1977 and became the major obstacle to establishing an African NWFZ. Denuclearization of South Africa was realized in 1990 only after the end of the Cold War\textsuperscript{9}. It took thirty-five years since the first UNGA resolution in 1961 for the African NWFZ Treaty, the Pelindaba Treaty, to be adopted in 1996.

Looking at the NWFZ in Latin America and the Caribbean, the proposal for the zone was first made by Costa Rica when it introduced a draft resolution to a Council of the Organization of the American States (OAS) in 1958\textsuperscript{10}. The NWFZ Treaty for the region, the Tlatelolco Treaty, was concluded in 1967 after four years’ negotiation on the treaty’s text. The 1962 Cuban crisis contributed to the general unification of regional efforts for a NWFZ treaty. As the Tlatelolco Treaty adopted an ingenious provision for the entry into force, the organization to ensure compliance with the obligations of the Treaty, OPNAL, began operation in 1967. However, two major countries in the region with the most advanced nuclear technology, Brazil and Argentina, remained outside control of the treaty.
It was suspected that competitive nuclear weapon programs of the two countries, including even preparation for nuclear tests that was later admitted by a Brazilian official, continued for decades. Under the prevailing regional norm of the freedom from nuclear weapons brought about by the Tlatelolco Treaty, the two countries advanced incremental measures for mutual confidence building and eventually established a bilateral agency, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) and then concluded a four party agreement for full-scope safeguards among the two countries, ABACC and IAEA in 1991. It was thirty-three years after the initial Costa Rican proposal.

It may be worthwhile to quote from a speech by a Canadian diplomat, William Epstein, who was deeply involved in the negotiation of the Tlatelolco Treaty. He said, “I cannot resist telling the story of how, when I first became involved in the work of the Treaty, I was told by senior diplomats of four nuclear powers...that I would be wasting my time and that there would never be an agreement on such a Treaty...It seems to be a truism that in politics and diplomacy, ‘never’ never means never.”

In the case of Southeast Asia nuclear-weapon-free-zone, it was in 1971 during the Cold War that five ASEAN countries declared the “Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN),” which explicitly included the concept of a NWFZ. However, the presence of nuclear weapons deployed by the United States at its military bases in the Republic of the Philippines (RP) was a matter of common knowledge and an obvious obstacle to the advancement of a Southeast Asia NWFZ concept. Thus, the rejection by the Philippine Senate of the extension of the U.S.-RP Military Bases Agreement in 1991 became a turning point and viable conditions for treaty negotiations came into existence. Negotiations were concluded in 1995 and the Bangkok Treaty on the Southeast Asia NWFZ became the first NWFZ treaty after the end of the Cold War. This process took twenty-four years from the time of the ZOPFAN declaration.

Even with respect to the NWFZ treaties that involved fewer difficulties in their negotiations, such as Rarotonga Treaty for the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, it took thirteen years to conclude that treaty after New Zealand introduced the idea to the South Pacific Forum in 1972. The Central Asia NWFZ treaty took thirteen years to be agreed upon since first proposed in a UNGA speech by the President of Uzbekistan in 1993.

These histories of the births of existing NWFZs indicate that the windows of treaty negotiations were opened by the political vision and will by one of the countries concerned, and ten to thirty years were needed for conclusion of the treaties by overcoming obstacles which differed from region to region. In the context of the Northeast Asia NWFZ, a lesson from these histories is that an inflexible way of thinking that any proposal for a NEA-NWFZ should come only after the DPRK’s definite abandonment of its nuclear programs is not
appropriate. Instead, a manifestation of the political will must come first for any progress to be achieved.

§ Significance of the Global Context
Transformation from the current security arrangement characterized by extended nuclear deterrence to a new arrangement featuring a NEA-NWFZ has special relevance to global efforts toward a world without nuclear weapons.

One of the obvious steps to be taken toward that goal after the new START, the strategic offensive arms reduction treaty between the United States and Russia, is further nuclear weapon reductions by the two countries whose nuclear stockpiles are estimated to exceed 95% of the global total. According to expert opinion, however, there is concern about whether the United States can take a bold step for further reductions unless its targeting policy is fundamentally changed by a new Presidential Policy Directive and its strict implementation. This has direct relevance to the responsibility of U.S. allies.

Those allies who request extended nuclear deterrence from the United States contribute to increasing specific numbers of targets to be attacked by U.S. nuclear weapons. As a consequence, this necessitates the United States maintain specific numbers of nuclear warheads for those attacks. The frequent assertion by Japanese foreign ministry officials that Japan’s nuclear umbrella policy does not contradict its nuclear disarmament policy is becoming more and more untrue as further deep cuts in the U.S. nuclear arsenal are imperative if a world without nuclear weapons is to be realized. Thus, transformation of security policy toward a NEA-NWFZ is very much wanted for all countries in this region, and especially for U.S. allies in the region.

Lastly are appended two statements to support the establishment of a NEA-NWFZ: one by 93 Japanese and Korean parliamentarians and the other by the 105 Japanese mayors.

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8 ibid.
Appendix 1

Joint Statement by Parliamentarians of Japan and the Republic of Korea on Denuclearization of Northeast Asia

The world now faces a critical juncture on the issue of nuclear weapons. On one hand, efforts are being made to resume the Six-Party Talks in order to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the establishment of a regional peace regime in Northeast Asia. On the other hand, efforts towards “a world free of nuclear weapons” are gaining support worldwide, under the leadership manifested in the address by U.S. President Barack Obama in Prague in April 2009 and the five point proposal, including a call for negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, pronounced by U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon at the U.N. Headquarters in October 2008.

The denuclearization of Northeast Asia, where conflicts among states with and without nuclear weapons have long continued, is a test case for global efforts to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. The history of Northeast Asia is paradoxical in that it is the sole region of the world to have suffered from the atrocity of nuclear warfare, while on the other hand, states in the region have continued to choose to rely on nuclear deterrence for their security.

Security based on nuclear deterrence will not bring real peace to the region. Rather, it will perpetuate insecurity rooted in arms races of distrust and never-ending confrontation. In order to liquidate the legacy of the Cold War and build peace in the region based on mutual trust, we, parliamentarians of Japan and the ROK, have agreed as follows:

1. We recognize the importance of solidarity and cooperation between Japan and the ROK in achieving the denuclearization of Northeast Asia, in which Japan, the ROK and the DPRK commit themselves not to possessing nuclear weapons, and the neighbor countries possessing nuclear weapons commit not to using or threatening to use such weapons against Japan the ROK and the DPRK, while striving for their own nuclear disarmament. Efforts by the Governments of Japan and the ROK, along with parliamentarians, local authorities, peace-loving citizens and NGOs in both countries, are critical to achieving this end.

2. We urge the Governments of Japan and the ROK to accelerate the normalization of relations with the DPRK through active dialogue and to seek solutions to the nuclear issues involving the DPRK through its return to the Six-Party Talks, as well as through credible measures taken by all the relevant countries to support its return.
3. We urge the Governments of Japan and the ROK to pledge and give support for medical care and compensation to the atomic bomb survivors including those from the DPRK and ROK and to second generation survivors, and to establish concrete systems for this as needed. The two governments should also raise public awareness regarding the importance of abolishing nuclear weapons by making the tragedy caused by the atomic bombing widely known, and should provide education based on the lessons learned from these experiences.

4. We recognize that a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-free Zone initiative will be effective for achieving the denuclearization of the region. We urge governments in the region, in particular those of Japan and the ROK, to fully discuss this proposal. We would also like to see various actors make continued efforts to gain international support. Especially, we call on the Governments of Japan and the ROK to advocate the establishment of a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-free Zone in the international fora, including the NPT Review Conference and the U.N. General Assembly.

5. We declare our unconditional support for efforts toward “a world free of nuclear weapons” laid out in the above-mentioned speeches by President Barack Obama and U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, believing that such efforts have opened a window of opportunity for achieving the denuclearization of Northeast Asia. We pledge to continue our cooperative efforts toward the denuclearization of Northeast Asia by grasping all available opportunities. We also appreciate international support and advice for our efforts while valuing lessons of existing NWFZs.

May 2010

Signed by (as of July 2011):

ROK Parliamentarians
CH0 Seung Soo  CHOI Younghee  KANG Gijung  KWON Young-Ghil
LEE Mikyung  PARK Eun Soo  SHIN Nakyun

Japanese Parliamentarians
ABE Tomoko  AIHARA Kumiko  AMIYA Shinsuke  ARAKI Kiyohiro
CHUGO Atsushi  DOI Ryuichi  DOKYU Seiichiro  FUJISUE Kenzo
FUJITA Kazue  FUJITA Yukihisa  FUJITANI Koushin  FUKUDA Eriko
FUKUSHIMA Nobuyuki  HACHIRO Yoshiro  HATA Tsutomu  HATSUSHIKA Akihiro
HATTORI Ryoichi  HIRAOKA Hideo  HIRAYAMA Tairo  ICHIKAWA Yasuo
Appendix 2

Statement of Support
for a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone

We, the undersigned, express our support for the efforts to establish a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in Northeast Asia (NEA-NWFZ). We believe it is an urgent and timely initiative both for strengthening the global tide toward a Nuclear Weapon Free World and for achieving regional stability and peace in Northeast Asia.

Setting the goal of achieving a NEA-NWFZ will create a new positive dimension in the on-going Six Party Talks among the Republic of Korea (ROK), Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK), Japan, China, Russia and the United States, by
incorporating its goal of “verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” (Six-nation Statement, 19 September 2005) within the broader regional vision.

Achieving a world free of nuclear weapons is an obligation not only of nuclear armed nations but of all nations, especially those whose security policy relies on a so-called nuclear umbrella. In this regards, all nations have the responsibility to find a path toward a security policy without nuclear weapons. A NEA-NWFZ will provide such a path for relevant nations in the region, including Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK).

A realistic scheme for a NEA-NWFZ would be a 3+3 arrangement, in which the ROK, the DPRK and Japan would form the central parties of the zone and the neighboring nuclear weapon states (China, Russia and the US) would support it through the provision of security assurances, as this would build upon the 1992 Inter-Korean Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula and Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

We call upon political leaders, both national and local, citizen groups, and individuals throughout the world, to express their support for a NEA NWFZ and to work together to realize it.

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Yoshiji Sato, Mayor of Kamikawa, Hokkaido Pref
Koetsu Sasaki, Mayor of Misato, Miyagi Pref
Kunio Saito, Mayor of Watari, Miyagi Pref
Kiyoshi Sato, Mayor of Murayama, Yamagata Pref
Nobuhiro Takahashi, Mayor of Kori, Fukushima Pref
Kenji Tomioka, Mayor of Takasaki, Gunma Pref
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Tatsuya Murakami, Mayor of Tokai, Ibaraki Pref
Yasushi Takahashi, Mayor of Mito, Ibaraki Pref
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